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The Rise and Fall of Canadian 
Military Assistance in the 
Developing World, 1952-1971 
Greg Donaghy 
S ince the end of the Second World War, military assistance has emerged as an important 
instrument of international diplomacy. Initially 
employed by the United States in Europe, Latin 
America and Asia for a variety of economic and 
political reasons in the mid-1940s, by the end of 
the decade American military assistance had been 
fashioned into a coherent program "whose 
principal goal was the containment of Communist 
expansion. "1 By the mid-1950s, both the Soviet 
Union and Communist China had responded with 
their own assistance programs designed to woo 
the developing states of Asia and Africa. 2 As 
Britain and France dissolved their colonial 
empires in the late 1950s, they too chose military 
aid as an effective way to maintain their links with 
the post-colonial state and to demonstrate their 
continued capacity to pursue independent global 
initiatives. 3 Other states were also attracted by 
this kind of aid. West Germany, for example, 
began distributing military assistance in 1960 as 
part ofits efforts to gamer intemational support 
for its claim to sovereignty. 4 
Canada's decision to supply small amounts 
of military assistance to the developing world 
owed relatively little to the cold war calculations 
of the superpowers and the considerations of 
national prestige that motivated other donors. 
Though Canadian diplomats recognized the 
benefits that military assistance might bring to 
the western world in the early 1950s, they were 
not especially anxious to divert scarce resources 
away from Europe towards the handful of small 
African and Asian states requesting aid. This was 
particularly true when any Canadian venture was 
likely to duplicate Washington's substantial efforts 
to secure regional allies with promises of military 
assistance. As a consequence, the Department of 
External Affairs wasted little time and effort in 
convincing a reluctant Department of National 
Defence to accept military assistance as part of 
its mandate. 
By the late 1950s, however, decolonization 
had begun to alter the relatively stable postwar 
intemational system. Disturbances in Burma and 
the collapse of intemal order in the former Belgian 
colony of the Congo brought the importance of 
military assistance into sharp focus. These 
developments underlined the danger that an 
inadequately trained military posed to national 
and international stability. Increasingly, officials 
in the Department of Extemal Affairs saw military 
assistance as an important means of contributing 
to the maintenance of order in the developing 
world. Consequently, in 1958 they began to press 
the Department of National Defence for a change 
in Canadian policy. 
The success of the East Block (refering to 
External Affairs, their location on Parliament Hill 
in Ottawa) in changing that policy in the early 
1960s depended on a number of factors. Both 
Diefenbaker and Pearson used military assistance 
to build personal relationships with new 
Commonwealth leaders and lent their 
considerable weight to the department's cause. 
At the same time, the dynamics of the inter-
departmental debate slowly changed in Canada 
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as the country's defence budget contracted in the 
early 1960s. As these budgetary reductions 
deprived Canadian industry of its domestic 
market, the Department of Defence Production 
became a vocal, and influential, proponent of 
military assistance. The same budget reductions 
also encouraged a more forthcoming attitude in 
the Department of National Defence, which could 
ill-afford to stand aside while other departments 
dipped into its training budget for their own 
purposes. With the support of the Chiefs of Staff, 
Canadian military assistance blossomed during 
the mid-1960s. At the same time, however, the 
conflict in Vietnam raised concern among a new 
generation of Canadian politicians about the 
dangers implicit in any overseas military 
commitment. As a result, the program was 
exposed to attack when the Trudeau government 
began to adjust its fiscal, military and foreign 
policies during its first term in office. 
Canadian policy-makers were first forced to 
confront the problem of military assistance in the 
early 1950s, when 'New Commonwealth' 
countries like India and Pakistan (as well as the 
occasional South American republic) approached 
Ottawa for help. Though inclined to respond 
positively to these requests, officials in the 
Department of External Mfairs advanced their 
case in careful and cautious terms. In one of the 
earliest efforts to articulate a rationale for military 
assistance, Charles Ritchie, the deputy under-
secretary of state, argued that such aid would 
serve primarily to increase Canada's heightened 
postwar international stature. A forthcoming 
response would also promote Canada's 
reputation as a proponent of a co-operative 
international order. Only with considerable 
diffidence did he suggest that military assistance 
might have any relevance to Canada's broader 
diplomatic objectives: 
We should not lose sight of the fact that some of 
these requests come from parts of the world in 
which western policy is often suspect. Anything 
we can do, however small, to offset this suspicion 
is an aid to our associates in both NATO and 
the Commonwealth, and is in our long-term 
interest. 5 
It was not surprising that Ritchie chose to define 
the benefits of military assistance in such 
circumscribed and modest terms. The 
international system's rigid bi-polarity limited the 
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scope for an independent and effective 
contribution from a smaller country like Canada. 
Consequently, the Department of External Affairs 
was not inclined to spend much effort overcoming 
the doubts frequently expressed by the 
Department of National Defence. 
Canada's defence authorities had good reason 
for their hostility to military assistance. The 
steady expansion of the Canadian armed forces 
in the early 1950s placed an almost intolerable 
strain on their training facilities. In 1951, this 
was exacerbated by the government's decision to 
train NATO air crew and pilots as part of Canada's 
mutual aid contribution.6 Complicating matters 
were the security issues that training non-NATO 
personnel increasingly raised. The Chiefs of Staff 
Committee was diligent in resisting the whole 
notion of military assistance. In the fall of 1953, 
it referred the problem to the Cabinet Defence 
Committee in a bid to end the East Block's half-
hearted efforts to have the department accept 
foreign trainees. While agreeing that Canada ought 
to provide friendly non-NATO nationals with 
military training from time to time, the cabinet 
insisted that "where space was available ... first 
priority should be given to Commonwealth and 
NATO Nationals.''7 
While the Department of National Defence 
enforced this policy vigorously for the rest of the 
decade - rejecting almost every request on the 
grounds of inadequate space- the rapid evolution 
of the cold war confrontation after 1954 rendered 
it vulnerable to criticism. After agreeing to the de 
facto partition of Vietnam at the Geneva 
Conference in July 1954, Moscow and Peking 
quickly abandoned their strategy of directly 
confronting the West in guerilla warfare. Instead, 
they encouraged the newly independent states of 
Mrica and Asia to pursue neutrality and non-
alignment. 8 Almost immediately both communist 
states enjoyed some success. In April 1955, for 
example, China's foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, 
assumed a leading role at the Bandung 
Conference of Asian and African nations. By 195 7, 
the Soviet Union had concluded economic 
assistance agreements with Egypt, India, Syria, 
Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, the Sudan and 
Yemen. 9 In turn, the forward policy adopted by 
China and the USSR forced the major colonial 
powers, Britain and France, to hasten the 
dissolution of their respective empires. 10 
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Both these developments were cause for 
increasing concem in Ottawa. In early 1956, the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. 
Pearson, warned that the Communist bloc's 
aggressive pursuit of allies in the developing world 
jeopardized Western influence in Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East.U Ottawa also feared that the 
accelerating pace of decolonization would create 
a host of weak and unviable states susceptible to 
"Communist infiltration. "12 At the official level, at 
least, these concems created an outlook much 
more inclined to embrace military assistance as 
an instrument of Canadian diplomacy. In the 
spring of 1957, G.R. Heasman, Canada's 
Ambassador to Djakarta, found a receptive 
audience when he attacked a Department of 
National Defence decision to reject an Indonesian 
request for navigation training. Outlining 
Moscow's continuing efforts to court Indonesia, 
Heasman placed considerable emphasis on the 
important role military assistance might play in 
"keeping Indonesia in the Western camp. "13 
Though unable to convince General Charles 
Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, to meet the Indonesian request, the 
Department of External Affairs was no longer 
prepared to accept the present state of affairs. 14 
In November 1958, it seized upon a request from 
Burma to press home its point of view. The desire 
to help offset Soviet influence in Asia by securing 
the support of newly independent states like 
Burma for the West remained the most important 
justification for Canadian assistance. Increasingly, 
however, the department's case for military aid 
reflected its growing appreciation of the 
intemational implications of decolonization in 
Africa and Asia. The department contended that 
Canada had a strategic interest in promoting the 
stability of former colonies with uncertain and 
inexperienced central govemments: 
In addition to our desire to encourage Western 
ties with Burma, we have a further interest in 
assisting the Burmese to improve their defence 
forces in order to strengthen their position 
against external aggression and in the 
maintenance of internal security ... [Burma] is 
faced with almost continuous rebellion on the 
part of the hill tribes and minority races, 
troubles with Communist Burmese rebels 
depredations by Chinese Nationalist forces and 
finally incursions from Communist China. The 
internal stability of Burma depends to a 
considerable extent on the Government's ability 
to keep dissident forces in check. 15 
Moreover, the department had begun to think that 
Canada, with its reputation for "genuine 
international cooperation," might be better 
qualified than some of the larger Western powers 
to undertake the delicate task of assisting the new 
nations of Asia and Africa develop the kind of all-
purpose armed forces they required. 16 
The significance of developments in the 
colonial world was not entirely lost on the 
Department of National Defence. In some 
quarters, support for training assistance had 
already begun to emerge. The Chief of General 
Staff, for example, thought that the army could 
accommodate some requests for military 
training. 17 The Director of the Regular Officer 
Training Plan agreed, noting the minister's 
interest in the subject and pointing out that it fell 
within the "[p ]resent government policy ... [of] 
fostering closer ties with and between other 
members of the Commonwealth."18 Yet, Foulkes 
refused to bend and offered officials in the East 
Block no grounds for hoping that he would 
eventually adopt a more forthcoming attitude. 19 
For John Holmes, assistant under-secretary of 
state, and George Glazebrook, the head of 
Commonwealth Division, the conclusion was 
obvious: the Department of National Defence 
must be made to "accept as a new aspect of 
Canadian military policy the expansion of training 
facilities, just as they have come to accept truce 
commission work as a normal part of their 
activities. "20 
The opportunity to tackle the Department of 
National Defence finally arrived in December 
1960, when the prime minister of Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah, asked the Canadian prime minister, 
John Diefenbaker, to provide instructors and 
medical officers for the Ghanaian Armed Forces 
( GAF). 21 Diefenbaker, who was committed to the 
co-operative ideals of the emerging 
Commonwealth, was inclined to grant the 
Ghanaian request.22 Following his meeting with 
Nkrumah at the 1961 Commonwealth prime 
ministers' conference, he instructed the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee to send an officer to West Africa 
to examine the situation. 23 For the moment at 
least, the prime minister's intervention muted 
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Captain John Hasek of the Black Watch of Canada carries out an inspection of officer cadets at the Ghanaian 
Military Academy. The Ghanaian Sergeant-Major accompanying Captain Hasek seems to be somewhat 
distracted by the unojflcial parade in front of the cadets. (CFPU CEN 66-109-9) 
opposition within the Department of National 
Defence to Canadian military assistance. 
The East Block seized this opportunity to 
secure cabinet approval for a more generous 
military assistance policy. The increasingly 
frenzied pace of developments in Africa added a 
new sense of urgency to the department's efforts. 
The situation in the former Belgian colony of the 
Congo was particularly disturbing. Within two 
weeks of acquiring its independence in June 
1960, the Congo erupted into a brutal and 
disastrous civil war that left over half the country 
without effective govemment by the end of the 
year. More ominously, the war threatened to bring 
the Soviet Union and the United States into direct 
conflict as neither power was prepared to accept 
a power vacuum in the middle of Africa. 24 To 
Canadian officials, who "very much hoped that 
Africa would not become and would not be 
regarded as another East-West political and 
propaganda battleground," the crisis in central 
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Africa underlined the importance of ensuring 
stability in former colonies. 25 Canadian military 
training assistance, argued the department in a 
submission to cabinet, represented a contribution 
to internal and international stability. For the first 
time, this was advanced as the primary rationale 
behind Canadian policy: 
Such assistance would constitute a direct, 
although modest contribution to the 
establishment of efficient and stable military 
forces in friendly countries where armed forces 
are often the largest single group of disciplined 
and trained personnel, and usually a good 
influence for law and order. Local armed forces, 
if properly trained and led, can contribute to 
stability and the preservation ofpeace?6 
In addition, there remained as an important 
secondary objective the desire to discourage 
developing countries from accepting assistance 
from the Communist bloc: 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/7
The alternative to the provision of training 
assistance is not always the supply of such 
assistance by another western country. In some 
cases the countries we fail to assist may feel it 
necessary to tum to the Soviet bloc for a helping 
hand. Experience has shown that the 
Communist countries are always eager to take 
advantage of such opportunities whenever they 
are offered. 
For good measure, the department added that 
personal contact between Canadians and foreign 
military personnel "would provide a wider 
understanding of Canada based on actual 
experience." Finally, there was also a need to 
demonstrate the benefits of continued 
membership in the Commonwealth to many of 
these countries. 27 
The possibility raised by the Ghanaian 
request - that training assistance might be 
delivered abroad provided the departments of 
External Affairs and National Defence with the 
slender basis necessary for a compromise. 
Overseas training would certainly meet Canada's 
political objectives as defined by officials in the 
East Block. At the same time, it would avoid some 
of the obstacles which were responsible for the 
Department of National Defence's earlier 
hesitations. There would no longer be fears that 
such training might impinge on prior 
commitments to Canadian and NATO training in 
Canadian facilities, or that it would jeopardize 
security on Canadian bases. In addition, 
Canadian instructors would be able to adjust their 
teaching methods to meet local language 
requirements and educational standards. Any 
extra costs associated with this kind of assistance, 
the two departments agreed, would normally be 
met by the recipient country. From now on, 
training in Canada would be offered only in the 
most exceptional circumstances and when all 
security, language and other requirements were 
met. 28 In June 1961, cabinet approved the 
conditions under which the two departments 
agreed that Canada would henceforth "accept as 
part of its defence commitments the training, if 
and when requested, of military personnel of 
Commonwealth countries. "29 
Despite the compromise endorsed by cabinet, 
doubts about the value of military assistance soon 
re-surfaced in the Department of National 
Defence. The Department's response a few 
months later to a Nigerian request for training 
assistance, for example, seemed designed to 
forestall any attempt to saddle it with a large 
military aid program. The Nigerian request was 
substantial: Lagos asked for 30 officer cadet 
training places in Canada and for Canadian 
instructors for its military academy.30 Informally, 
Nigeria also asked for help in developing its own 
air force. The level of assistance eventually 
proposed by the Department of National Defence 
was disappointingly small. It agreed to make 
available places for Nigerian cadets within existing 
army, navy and air force training facilities but 
declined to dispatch a training team to Nigeria 
and ignored completely the request for air force 
help.31 
In the East Block this attitude raised two 
disturbing considerations. First, the Department 
of National Defence was abandoning a possible 
market for Canadian aircraft by refusing to 
address the needs of the Nigerian air force. 
Second, and far more important, the department's 
limited program jeopardized at least part of the 
rationale behind Canadian military assistance: 
Canada has sent a full training team to Ghana, 
a neighbouring but smaller Commonwealth 
country, whose government follows a neutralist 
and occasionally anti-Western foreign policy. We 
believe that from a purely political point of view, 
it would be inadvisable to come up with a 
significantly smaller proposal to the Nigerians 
who follow a generally friendly line. 32 
Howard Green, the secretary of state for external 
affairs, suggested instead that Ottawa send an 
officer to Nigeria to explore how Canada might 
provide some help. The minister of national 
defence refused to be drawn and rejected further 
suggestions from his colleague that Canada 
should explore a possible contribution to the 
Nigerian air force and that Canada should agree 
to pay half the cost of training the Nigerian 
cadets.33 Cabinet, alive to the consequences of 
appearing to favour Ghana over its west African 
neighbour, sided with Green and agreed that 
Canada would train 32 Nigerian cadets and would 
absorb over half the estimated cost of $275,000. 
Further, Canada would provide a Commandant 
and a Director of Studies for a military academy 
as well as a six-man naval training team. 
Altogether, the program would cost Canada 
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approximately $250,000, roughly the amount 
being spent on the program in Ghana. 34 
This was not quite the victory desired by the 
Department of External Affairs. It pegged 
Canada's military assistance at a fairly low level 
and failed completely to deal with the informal 
Nigerian request for help in setting up their air 
force. The refusal to exert a greater effort in 
Nigeria, which left the Department of External 
Mfairs reluctant to meet several new Ghanaian 
requests for fear of upsetting the balance of 
Canadian efforts in West Mrica, disturbed officials 
in the East Block. 35 The whole question of military 
assistance clearly needed to be re-visited by the 
two departments. A request in the spring of 1963 
for instructors and equipment to set up a joint 
air force school for the three East African 
Commonwealth countries of Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanganyika seemed likely to provide the ideal 
opportunity for a wide-ranging inter-departmental 
discussion. 36 
This discussion, however, was a long time 
coming. The Tanganyikan request, which was first 
forwarded to the Department of National Defence 
in early April 1963, was quickly shunted aside 
by the new Minister of National Defence, Paul 
Hellyer. 37 Intent on re-organizing the Canadian 
military, Hellyer refused to undertake any further 
commitments until the process was finished. 38 
Over the next few months, the Department of 
External Mfairs became increasingly distressed 
at Canada's inability to respond to requests for 
assistance from such countries as Ghana, 
Malaysia and the West Indies. The Tanganyikan 
request for assistance, however, remained 
particularly frustrating. In part, this was due to 
A Canadian instructor, Captain John Sharp, watches mortar instruction at the 
Ghanaian Army Training School, December 1966. (CFPU CEN 66-109-50) 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/7
Prime Minister L.B. Pearson's promise of aid 
which he gave to the Tanganyikan prime minister, 
Julius Nyerere, during the latter's visit to Ottawa 
in July 1963. Tanganyikan defence authorities 
were not the least bit shy about recalling the prime 
minister's commitment whenever military 
assistance was discussed with the Canadian High 
Commission.39 The department was also growing 
concerned that Tanganyika might turn to 
Communist sources for its aid. 40 Before Ottawa 
could resolve the question of aid to Tanganyika, 
the context in which military assistance was 
considered changed dramatically. The catalyst 
was West Germany's decision to help Dar-es-
Salaam develop a small air force by providing a 
training team and a handful of aircraft. 41 
In Ottawa, the Department of Defence 
Production reacted with alarm at the West 
German decision. C.M. Drury, its minister, had 
already expressed his concern at Canada's failure 
to assist Nigeria with its air force and had been 
brushed aside by Hellyer. 42 Drury now angrily 
insisted that something be done to avoid the 
fumbling that characterized Canada's efforts to 
respond to the Nigerian and Tanganyikan 
requests for air force assistance. Canada was 
clearly in danger of losing substantial markets 
for its aircraft and needed to develop a more 
cogent policy on military assistance. 43 This time, 
the Department of National Defence was ready to 
oblige. During the preceding year, the department 
had grudgingly come to conclude that its 
unsuccessful opposition to military assistance 
threatened its ability to influence the nature of 
Canadian military aid while leaving it responsible 
for all of the costs. Clearly, it made more sense to 
establish a comprehensive program with its own 
establishment and its own budget over which the 
department could exercise some control. 44 
Officials in the Department of External Affairs 
happily embraced their new allies. During June 
and July 1964, they met frequently with their 
colleagues from the departments of Finance, 
Defence Production and National Defence to 
consider how more adequate machinery might 
be developed. At the official level it was agreed 
quickly that both new procedures and new funds 
would be required to deal with the problems 
plaguing military assistance. Though they 
remained uncertain which department would 
administer these funds, officials were united on 
the size and nature of Canadian military 
assistance. Finance, External Affairs and National 
Defence moved quickly to ensure that commercial 
considerations, despite their role in sparking this 
re-consideration of Canadian policy, supplied very 
little of the official rationale for a continuing 
program of Canadian military assistance. 45 
Instead, military assistance was treated as an 
adjunct to Canada's general aid policy. Its 
foremost purpose was to help recipient 
governments maintain the internal stability 
necessary for political, social and economic 
growth. Naturally enough, officials tended to see 
Communist bloc aid as inherently destabilizing. 
Hence, the program had a second objective: it was 
to discourage recipient countries from accepting 
military help from the Communist bloc. Military 
assistance was also intended to strengthen 
Canadian and Western influence. 
In order to determine whether specific 
requests appeared likely to meet these goals, this 
ad hoc group of officials proposed that cabinet 
establish an interdepartmental Military 
Assistance Committee. Composed of 
representatives from four departments- External 
Affairs, Finance, National Defence and Defence 
Production - the committee would submit its 
recommendations to the Cabinet Committee on 
External Affairs and Defence for approval. In 
addition, they proposed endowing Canada's new 
military assistance program with a $5 million 
budget, a figure which was to account for whatever 
aid cabinet eventually decided to send to Tanzania 
and Malaysia. In separate memoranda, cabinet 
was also urged to send survey missions to these 
two countries to explore their long-standing 
requests for aid. 
In August 1964, cabinet considered the 
recommendations proposing a general program 
of military assistance and the problem posed by 
Tanzania and Malaysia. Several ministers 
questioned the proposed scale of Canadian aid. 
The minister of national defence, though he 
generally approved of the recommendations, 
worried that the provision of aid might "involve 
us in commitments for the security of these 
countries which would be inappropriate for 
Canada and might better be undertaken by other 
western powers."46 The prime minister, in 
particular, worried about the dangers involved in 
assisting developing nations build up their 
81 
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Fli~ht Lieutenant K.R. Johnson of the RCAF briefs two Tanzanian pilots 
pnor to an operational flight at Dar-es-Salaam. The aircraft in the 
background is a de Haviland Canada Caribou. (CFPU CEN 66-109-15) 
military forces. He clearly considered military 
assistance too sensitive a subject to be left solely 
in the hands of the bureaucracy. Instead, he 
suggested that cabinet examine "each future 
proposal... singly and on its merits. "4 7 
Nevertheless, Pearson and his colleagues 
endorsed the arguments in favour of a more 
dynamic military assistance program, instructed 
their officials to establish the proposed inter-
departmental Military Assistance Committee, and 
despatched survey teams to Asia and Africa. 
Despite its reluctance to establish a 
continuing program of military assistance, 
cabinet's decisions seemed clearly headed in that 
direction. In December 1964, upon receipt of the 
survey mission's report, cabinet agreed to send a 
training mission to Tanzania and to accept 
Tanzanian officer cadets. Intended to operate for 
five years, the Tanzanian program was expected 
to cost over $5 million. The following January, in 
response to a recommendation received from the 
Military Assistance Committee, cabinet agreed to 
spend over $4 million assisting Malaysia during 
the next 27 months. Finally, in late February 1965, 
displeased that Dar-es-Salaam had decided to 
accept an East German consular representative, 
Bonn withdrew all its aid and Nyerere turned to 
Canada to fill the void. Quickly, cabinet agreed 
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that Canada would train and equip a small air 
force wing at a cost that approximated the $9.2 
million originally allotted the project by Bonn. 
By now Canada was operating programs with 
a total cost of $7,664,316 for the 1965-66 fiscal 
year.48 In addition to the major programs involving 
Ghana, Nigeria, Malaysia and Tanzania, Canada 
had agreed to train a small number of officer 
cadets from Jamaica and Zambia. Early in the 
summer of 1965, the Department of External 
Affairs took steps to place the whole military 
assistance program on much firmer footing. 49 In 
addition to resolving a number of administrative 
irritants, the program changes sought from 
cabinet would significantly expand the Military 
Assistance Committee's terms of reference. 
Specifically, the committee would be given 
supervisory authority over the implementation of 
military assistance programs once they had been 
approved by Cabinet. This authority would allow 
the committee to adjust those programs so that 
the needs of recipient countries might be met 
better within the financial ceilings approved by 
Cabinet. 
The proposed memorandum to cabinet also 
contained a more far-reaching proposal. The 
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Military Assistance Committee was to be 
authorized to approve without reference to 
ministers the provision of training assistance 
"which would not involve significant political 
considerations, numbers of trainees or total 
expenditure." The proposed $300,000 budget 
represented a significant increase over the 
approximately $15,000 then being spent on 
equivalent short term aid provided to Zambia and 
Jamaica. Though several of its members 
expressed continued doubts about the value of 
military assistance, the Cabinet Committee on 
Extemal Affairs and Defence approved these 
recommendations in February 1966.50 
With this decision, Canada's military 
assistance program at last had all the elements 
of an established and coherent operation. For the 
first time, officials in the East Block could hope 
to respond quickly and efficiently to modest 
requests for specialized types of training. The 
Department of External Affairs, however, had no 
opportunity to build on this small victory and 
combine the discretionary spending program with 
the four larger programs into a fully-integrated 
military assistance scheme. 5 1 With the election of 
the Trudeau government in June 1968, the 
officials responsible for military assistance found 
themselves increasingly preoccupied with the 
struggle to defend and justify other, more 
important, elements of Canadian defence policy. 52 
With little waming, in July 1969, Cabinet decided 
to phase out military assistance over a three year 
period beginning in fiscal year 1970-71.53 
Cabinet's decision was taken within the 
context of a cost-cutting exercise and there is no 
reason to doubt the view that military assistance 
was primarily a victim of budgetary pressures. 
However, a glance at an attempt to reverse this 
decision the following year- a concerted effort by 
the Department of External Affairs, the 
Department of National Defence and the 
Department of Industry Trade and Commerce -
reveals why military assistance was so vulnerable. 
This effort to revive the program was strongly 
opposed by a number ofliberal-minded ministers. 
After a decade or more of military assistance 
programs, they argued with some justification, 
most recipient states had sufficient resources to 
preserve internal order. Canadian aid could be 
better spent on a variety of projects that met more 
basic human needs. In addition, as the last 
remnants of colonial order collapsed in Africa and 
Asia, the possibility that Canada might find itself 
drawn into a Vietnam-like civil war was advanced 
as a reason for caution. 54 Such arguments helped 
erode support for military assistance at the 
political level. This was clearly reflected in the 
scale of the program cabinet agreed to revive: the 
$500,000 budget allotted to the Military Training 
Assistance Program represented only one-sixth 
the average annual expenditure between 1961 and 
1969. This program, which would provide 
training in Canadian facilities only, and 
specifically precluded the transfer of military 
equipment abroad, was much more modest in 
its expectations. Eschewing the larger strategic 
considerations that had motivated the Canadian 
program since the late 1950s, the new Military 
Training Assistance Program reflected the 
reduced Canadian commitment to 
internationalism that characterized Canadian 
foreign policy under Trudeau. 
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